A famous example often cited by legal scholars, was a case involving the Getty Oil and Pennzoil in very early 1984. The parties had signed a "Memorandum of Agreement" _ viewed by the parties at the time as a Letter of Intent _ for a complex investment and stock transaction, whereby Pennzoil would purchase Getty Oil stock, and set forth general terms of the investment that had been reached in conversations, and also stipulated that the Memorandum was subject to the approval of the Board of Getty Oil. The Board of Getty Oil sooner approved the transaction and both parties announced on January 4, 1984 in a press release, an "agreement in principle" to the terms of the Memorandum. The final agreements for the merging of Texaco and Getty Oil were signed by the parties on January 6 _ 8.
The long and short of the story, is that the court, after scrutinizing not only the Memorandum, but also the wordings of the press releases and other documents that Getty Oil and Pennzoil had issued over the course of their dealings, found Getty Oil to be "in breach" of the Memorandum of Agreement _ the document the parties had viewed as a letter of intent. Thus, a document (the letter of intent) that the parties had started out viewing as non_binding and unenforceable, had changed from being that, to being a final agreement! Pennzoil, on the other hand, ended up with บǒ billion (later settled for ū billion) from Texaco for interfering in its deal with Getty Oil.